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40 VIRGINIA Z.AW REVIEW 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PEACETIME 
CONSCRIPTION.* 
[Vol. 31 
THERE has been much written, pro· and con, concerning the 
federal government's constitutional power to conscript men 
or women for training and service in the armed forces. Both 
sides have been guilty of quoting judicial statements completely 
out of their context and citing cases for propositions not in fact 
decided. Extreme advocates of military power have gone so far 
as to claim that the Constitution is inoperative ill war time and 
that the government may do anything necessary to "wage war 
successfully." 1 ·on the other hand, such a constitutional au-
thority as Daniel Webster employed language in opposition to 
*A professor of law at the College attended by Jefferson, who publishes 
his article at the School founded by that great proponent of people's rights 
against governmen,t, need not apologize for giving attention to the single 
greatest challenge to those rights to-day. A great deal more research is needed 
in this field which remains . to be pioneered. The pertinency of the· question 
is further attested by the pending May Bill, H. R 3947 ·and Guerney-Wads-
worth Bill, S. 701, H. R 1806 for which the President is urging passage in 
January, 1945. I shall not discuss the constitutionality of President Roose-
velt's suggestion, of one year of non-military service (like the C. C. C.). 
There is even less justification in the Constitution for such an act. 
1. RANDAI.I., CoNsTrTunoNAI. PBOBI.EMS UNDER LrNCOI.N (1926) 30; H. R. 
REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1942) 147; Hucm:s, WAR POWERS ux-
Dl>R THE CoNsnroTroN (1936) 42 A. B. A. Rep. 232, 238; HATCHER, MARnAI. 
LAw AND HABEAS CoRPUS (1940) 46 W.VA. L. Q. 187; CoRwiN, AMJ>RICA~ 
Govl>RNMJ>N'r IN WARnME (1943) 37 AM. Por.. Scr. REv. 18 ff. 
Tfuit all these assertions go too far can be seen from George Washington's. 
letter transmitting the Constitution to Congress : 
''The frien,ds of our country have long seen and desired that the power of 
making war, peace, and treaties ; that of levying money and regulating-
commerce; and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities, shall 
be fully and effectually vested in the general government of the Union. 
But the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one body of men-
is evident. Then.ce results the necessity of a different organization." 
1 Er.uOT's DEBATES 305 (Referen,ces herein are to the 1876 edition-a more 
convenient form is the 1941 edition, the first three volumes being included in 
new volume I and 4 and 5 in II). 
In short the Convention is saying: Many people may have. desired unlim-
ited federal power i~ a given, area-this Constitution is a compromise (arid. 
wise!y so) based on limited power. 
1944] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PEACETIME CONSCRIPTION 41 
military conscription which would have rendered impossible any 
compulsory service, including jury or road maintenance duty.2 
We must eschew this kind of analysis. It is clear that there 
are limits on the war power as there are on every federal power. 
We must try, as the Court did in the Second Flag Salute case,8 
to find sound constitutional rules to "translate the majestic gen-
eralities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of 
liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete re-
straints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth 
century." Since this article is of interest to laymen as well as to 
lawyers, I shall seek to avoid being narrowly legalistic. I shall 
not, however, ?-ttempt to advance our discussion by those "over-
simplifications, handy in political debate", but lacking "the preci-
sion necessary to * * * judicial reasoning'' as the govern-
ment did in the flag case in urging broad governmental powers 
on the basis of Lincoln's dilemma: "Must a government of ne-
cessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to 
maintain its own existence ?"-the use of which called forth the 
Supreme Court censure.8a 
I shall state several broad avenues of judicial approach down 
which we must go in facing the issue of conscription, with which 
approaches most constitutional lawyers would readily agree. I 
shall then attempt to work out a sound delimitation of federal 
power, from the Constitution and cases. These approaches and 
the conclusions reached are first stated in outline form and are 
then more fully developed and annotated in separate paragraphs. 
Outline. 
A. General Approach. 
1. Dicta, i. e., incidental remarks not necessary to a decision 
are no authority in later cases. 
2. 14 WRITINGS AND SPt£C:ats oF DANIEL W:essTtR (1903 eel.) 55-69. Yet 
such services have been enforced: Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328, 36 Sup. Ct. 
258 (1916); Crews v. Lundquist, 361 Ill. 193, 197 N. E. 768 (1935). 
3. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 
636, 639, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178, 1184, 1186 (1943). 
3a. Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency (1942) 
55 HARv. L. REv. 1253, 1278, makes use of an,other of Lincoln's expressions 
to advance the military argument: "by general law, life and limb must be pro-
tected, yet often a limb must be· amputated to save a life; but life is never 
given to save a limb." 
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2. Even past decisions of the Supreme Court must be re-
examined as to their constitutional soundness. Pre-
vious decisions have been reversed by the court. 
3. There is a strong and growing recognition by the Court 
that the civil rights of individuals must be carefully 
protected against government encroachment--even 
though the government is thereby incommoded. 
4. In our plan of government the civil must always be su-
preme over the military. 
5. No emergency, not even war, suspends the Constitution. 
6. The federal government has only those powers granted 
it by the Constitution; it has no "inherent" power and 
must keep within the powers given. 
7. A variety of rules of construction must· be harmonized 
so as to discover the true spirit of the Constitution, 
leaving every part fully operative within its own 
proper sphere. 
B. Constitutional Provisions and Court Decisions. 
1. The only powers conferred on the federal government, 
important to this discussion, are in these words : 
Art. 1, Sec. 8. "The Congress shall have power. * * ~ 
"To declare War. * * *" 
"To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation 
of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than 
two Years; 
"To provide and maintain a Navy; 
"To make Rules for the Government and Regnlation 
of the land and naval Forces; 
"To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the 
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel In-
vasions; 
"To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining 
the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may 
be employed in the Service of the United States, reserv-
ing to the States respectively, the Appointment of the 
Officers, and the Authority of Training the Militia ac-
cording to the discipline prescribed by Congress; * * * 
"To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. * * * 
Art. II, Sec. 2. "The President shall be Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and 
of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States; * * *" 
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Amendment II. 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms, shall not be infringed. 
2. There is no court decision wherein it was necessary to 
uphold peacetime conscription; no cour.t decision au-
thorizing conscription into military service of women 
or those religiously opposed to war; there are two de-
cisions fully reasoning the constitutional validity of 
wartime conscription. All decisions or dicta concern-
ing conscription may have to be re-evaluated in the 
light of the tendencies discussed in the General Ap-
proach, above, and in view of the conditions of mod-
ern war. 
C. A Constitutionally Sound Military System. 
L In Peacetime. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
The federal government cannot conscript for train-
ing the general manpower of the country. The 
adult manpower constitutes the militia, which is a 
State organization existing without conscription. 
These men can only be trained by the states as a 
militia, i. e., at home, "civilians primarily (shop-
keepers, doctors, lawyers) ; soldiers on occasion." 
Women are not part of the militia and cannot be 
conscripted and trained for military service by either 
the State or Federal government. 
Those conscientiously opposed to bearing arms 
cannot be conscripted or trained in the militia for 
military service. 
It was intended that the federal government 
should have a small standing army of volunteers. 
The States were to maintain no troops. 
2. In Wartime. 
(a) War is a factual condition and may exist without 
formal declaration, thus bringing into play the 
war powers. 
(b) There is no limit on the size of the federal volun-
teer army or upon its use. 
(c) When attacked the federal government may call, 
by draft or other fair method, any or all of the 
state militia (the general manpower) into the na-
tional service until the attack has been repulsed. 
44 
(d) 
(e) 
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The federal government may use these men abroad, 
for "repel" includes to "drive back". The attack 
may occur at any one of our possessions, or per-
haps even to one of our ships or nationals. 
Under modern war conditions it may be that direct 
conscription of general manpower into a federal 
"wartime army'' is proper. 
The protection of religious freedom and similar 
exists in wartime as in peacetime, and persons 
conscientiously opposed to war cannot be con-
scripted for military service or compelled to fight. 
Dicta Is No Authority. 
It would normally not be t;Iecessary to cite this ·rule to lawyers. 
Yet the frequency with which exponents of peacetime conscrip-
tion have relied solely on dicta co;mpels the reference. Typical of 
the military's attempt to sustain compulsory conscription is the 
article of Major Claude B. Mickelwait of the Judge Advocate 
General's Office.3~> He quotes from Tarbles case,4 Jacobsen v. 
Massachusetts,5 In re Grimley 6 and U. S. v. Williams 7 as his 
sole authorities for upholding peacetime conscription. Not only 
do these- cases not involve peacetime conscription; they do not 
·involve conscription-peacetime or wartime. Tarble was a minor , 
who volunteered without his parents' consent; U. s: v. Williams 
upheld the enlistment of a minor though his parents ·attempted 
to attach conditions to their consent. Grimley was another en-
listee who sought discharge from the army on the ground that he 
was oyer age when he volunteered. The Jacobsen case involved 
compulsory vaccination . of civilians. Major Mickelwait could 
cite no authorities since there were none--there had not been a 
federal peacetime conscrip~on law prior to 1940. As discussed 
elsewhere in this article, no cases subsequent to 1940 and prior 
to Pearl Harbor squarely rule.d on· the constitutionality of peace-
time conscription. 
Sb. (1940) 26 A. B. A. Jour. 701. 
4. 13 Wall. 397, 408 (U. S. 1871). 
5. 197 U. S. 11, 29, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 374 (1904). 
6. 137 U. S. 147, 153, 11 Sup. Ct. 54, 59 (1890). 
7. 302 U. S. 46, 48, 58 Sup. Ct. 81, 83 (1937). 
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Tendency of the Supreme Court to Reverse Previous 
Extremely Nationalistic Decisions. 
A list of cases in which the Supreme Court has reversed itself 
when mature judgment proved that its prior position was wrong 
are found in Helvering v. Grifliths.8 Nearly everyone knows that 
the "white primary" case, Grovey v. Townsend} which had held 
that negroes could be barred from party primaries without viola-
tion of the federal constitution, was reversed in April 1944, the 
Court saying: "when convinced of former error, this Court has 
never felt constrained to foiiow precedent." 10 
But it is to reversals .or reversals in effect, which are more 
specificaiiy related to conscription that we must turn. Gilbert v. 
Mimzesota 11 had held, during the last war, that a man could be 
found guilty of the crime of causing disaffection in the armed 
services under a state anti-espionage statute, for saying : 
"Have you had anything to say as to whether we would go 
into this war? You know you have not. If this is· such a 
great democracy, for Heaven's sake why should we not vote 
on conscription of men. We were stampeded into this war 
by newspaper rot to puii England's chestnuts out of the fire 
for her. I teii you if they conscripted wealth like they have 
conscripted men, this war would not last over forty-eight 
hours." 
Under a somewhat similar Mississippi statute the Court recently 
held 12 that a person could not constitutionaily be found guilty 
of a crime for stating: 
"that it was wrong for our President to send our boys across 
in uniform to fight our enemies ; that it was wrong to fight 
our enemies ; that these boys were being shot down for no 
purpose at ail; * * * that the quicker people here quit 
bowing down and worshipping and saluting our flag and 
Government the sooner we would have peace." 
or for passing out literature, which read in part: 
8. 318 U. S. 371, 401, 63 Sup. Ct. 636, 652 (1943). Sec also the list in 88 
L. Ed. (a!lv.) 701, 709 (1944). 
9. 295 U. S. 45, 55 Sup. Ct. 622 (1934). 
10. Allwright v. Smith, 88 L. Ed. (adv.) 701, 709 (1944). See Cushman, 
The Texas "White Primary" Case-smith v. Allwright (1944) 30 CoRN. L. 
Q. 66. ~ 
11. 254 U. S. 325, 41 Sup. Ct. 125 (1919). 
12. Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583, 63 Sup. Ct. 1200 (1943). 
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"Almighty God commands that they (true Christians) must 
remain entirely neutral in the controversy * * * the 
so-called democracies hold out no hope of peace, security, 
life or happiness * * * if there is a conflict between 
state law and what Jehovah's witnesses conceive to be 
Jehovah's law, the state law should not be obeyed * * *" 
At a later point in this article the exten.t to which the Schneider-
man communist case has overruled the two conscientious objector 
cases of Macintosh and Schwimmer is discussed. 
In the Gobitis case 13 in 1941 the Court had held that a child 
of the Jehovah's Witness faith could be compelled to salute the 
American flag as a necessary part of achieving the patriotic 
solidarity which it was believed could alone carry forward the 
war. In June of 1943, in West Virginia State Board of Ed-uca-
tion v. Barnette, 14 the Court reversed its position on the ground 
that religious and similar liberties "are susceptible of restriction 
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which 
the state may lawfully protect * * *" Justice Jackson went 
on to say: 
"The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them 
into collision with rights asserted by any other individual 
* * * The sole conflict is between authority and rights 
of the individual. * * * 
"Government of limited power need not be anemic government. 
Assurance that rights are secure tends to diminish fear and 
jealousy of strong government, and by making us feel safe 
to live under it makes for its better support. Without prom-
ise of a limiting .Bill of Rights it is doubtful if our Constitu-
tion could have mustered enough strength to enable its rati-
fication. To enforce those rights today is not to choose weak 
government over strong government. It is only to adhere 
as a means of strength to individual freedom of mind in 
preference to officially disciplined uniformity for which 
history indicates a disappointing and disastrous end * * * 
"Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find 
themselves -exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unifica-
tion of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. 
"It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment 
13. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010 
(1939). 
14. 319 U. S. 624, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178 (1943). 
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to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by 
avoiding these beginnings. * * * 
"The action of Congress in making flag observance voluntary 
and respecting the conscience of the objector in a matter so 
vital as raising the Army contrasts sharply with these local 
regulations. * * * 
"But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not 
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. 
The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things 
that touch the heart of the. existing order. 
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, 
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein." 
The trend away from extreme nationalism and particularly away 
from coerced national unity is obvious. It cannot be lightly dis-
posed of in considering peacetime conscription, a form of coerced 
unity, to which there will be much more violent opposition than 
to wartime drafts. 
Increased Protection of Individual Civil Rights. 
One has only to read the six civil liberties cases decided by the 
United States Supreme Court at the October 1918 term 15 and 
compare these with the most recent civil rights decisions of 1943-
44 to sense the increased emphasis on protection of individual 
freedom even at some considerable risk to society. The steps 
by which this has been achieved can be traced: A liperal con-
struction of the Bill of Rights in favor of the individual was first 
recognized.16 Then the power to abridge personal liberties be-
came considered "the exception rather than the rule." 17 Next the 
15. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919) ; 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919) ; Baer v. 
United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919) ; Sugarman v. United 
States, 249 U. S. 182, 39 Sup. Ct. 191 (1918) ; Frohwerk v. United States, 
249 U. S. 204, 39 Sup. Ct. 249 (1918) ; Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 
211, 39 Sup. Ct. 252 (1918). 
16. Sgro v. United States, 287 U. S. 206, 53 Sup. Ct. 138 (1932) ; Grau 
v. United States, 287 U. S. 124, 53 Sup. Ct. 38 (1932) ; United States v. 
Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 52 Sup. Ct. 420 (1931), and Go-Bart Importing· 
Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 51 Sup. Ct. 153 (1930). 
17. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 258, 57 Sup. Ct. 732, 739 (1936) ; 
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Court accepted the position that there is no presumption of con-
stitutionality of an act claimed to i~fringe civil liberties.18 The 
Court rejected the test of "threatened danger in its incipiency" 19 
and definitely required a "clear and present' danger" before civil 
liberties could pe restricted. 20 Such limitation on the miUtary 
had always been the rule; 21 here it was extended to the- civil. 
Government was compelled to undergo some inconvenience or 
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255 (1936) ; and Lovell v. 
Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1937) and cases cited therein. 
18. United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, 58 Sup. 
Ct. 778, 783 (1937); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U. S. 147, 161, 60 Sup. Ct. 
146, 150 (1939); (1940) 40 Cor.. L. Rltv. 531, 532. 
19. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1924). 
20. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 57 Sup. Ct. 732 (1936). There are 
those who find a clear return to thi~ rule -as. early as Fiske v. Kan,olas, 274 
U. S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct. 655 (1927) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 
Sup. Ct. 641 (1927); and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 
(1931). 
21. Two cases involving the taking of• property in time of war, on the 
claim that it was necessary in order to prevent its falling into the hands 
of the enemy, serve as illustration,s. In United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 
623, 627-8 (U. S. 1871), the rule was stated as, "the public danger must 
be immediate, imminen,t, and impending, and the emergency in the public 
service must be extreme and imperative, and such as will not admit of de-
lay or a resort to any other source of supply." In Mitchell v. Harmony, 
13 How. 115 (U. S. 1851) since the evidence showed that the seizure was 
for the purpose of using the property in a forthcoming campaign, rather than 
to prevent the property coming into the enemy's possession, the plaintiff was 
allowed to recover against the military officer. The Court's language is very 
-clear : "But in every such case the danger must be present or impending, an,d 
the necessity such as does not admit of delay or the intervention of the civil 
-authority to prqvide the requisite mean,s * * * he must also prove what the 
nature of the emergency was, or what he had reasonable grounds to believe 
it to be; and it will then be for the court and jury to say whether it was so 
-pressing as to justify an invasion of private right." Sterling v. Constantin, 
.287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup: Ct. 190 (1932). "The absence of necessity for mili-
:tary order of the Governor * * * is established by showing that there was 
·no actual uprising or showing of violence or anything more than threats of 
violence, breaches of the peace against oil producers, and that there was no 
closure of the courts or failure of civil authorities." Miller v. United States, 
11 Wall. 268 (U. S. 1870); Es parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9,487 
(1861); Es parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (U. S. 1863); Es parte Mil-
ligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866); 2 Black 635 (U. S. 1862). The majority, in 
the Milligan case, in, a dictum denied Congress power to establish "martial 
law" except in case of actual, present invasion. The minority believed that 
Congress had the power in cases of "imminen.t public danger," "where ordi-
nary law no longer adequately secures public safety an~ private rights." 
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inefficiency and undertake some danger and certain risks rather 
than cut down civil liberties. 22 Religious freedom was given 
«every possible leeway." 23 Until finally, in the midst of this war, 
persons have been protected in their right to refuse to salute the 
flag, to criticize the government in its undertaking or waging-
the war.24 This development has occurred since the Selective 
Draft Law Cases of 1917 and constitutes a restriction on those 
22. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 162-4, 60 Sup. Ct. 146, 152r 
157 (1939) "* * * the public convenience * * * does not justify an. 
exertion of the police power which invades the free communication. of infor-
mation and opinion secured by the Constitution." "* * * If it is said that 
these means are less efficient and convenient * * * the answer is that con-
siderations of this sort do not empower a mun,icipality to abridge freedom of 
speech and press." See also: Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. 
S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260 (1925); Weaver v. Palmer Brothers, 270 U. S. 402, 
46 Sup. Ct. 320 (1925) ; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 
746 (1939); Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939); Jeho-
vah's Witness cases of 1943, including West Virginia State Bd. of Educa-
tiol\ v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178 (1943) and Martin v. City of 
Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 63 Sup. Ct. 862 (1943) ; Carlson v. California, 310 
U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1939.); Hague v. C. I. 0;, 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. 
Ct. 954 (1939) (Note that this approach stems back to earlier dissenting opin-
ions); Burns Baking Co. et al. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504, 517, 520, 44 Sup. Ct. 
412, 415, 416 (1924); and Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 597, 600, 37 Sup. 
Ct. 662, 665, 666 (1916). In Thornhiii v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102, 60 Sup. 
Ct. 736, 744 (1939), although the Court recognized a present danger, it bal-
anced the value of labor organization against internal order an.d employer's 
rights and found certain risks worth taking "in the circumstances of our 
times * * * [to preserve] the area of free discussion that is guaranteed 
by the Constitution." And in Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 
Sup. Ct. 666 (1937); Schneider v. New Jersey (and companion cases), 308 
U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 
Sup. Ct. 255 ( 1936) ; Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 
(1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939) 
though it was clear that some "danger" or risk was present, the Court per-
mitted free discussion to prevail. See also: Bridges v. State of California, 
314 U. S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941) and Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior 
Court, 314 U. S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941). 
See review of cases in Reisman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition 
(1942) 3 Public Policy 33-96. 
23. Minersviiie School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 
1010 (1939). Sec United States v. Baiiard, 88 L. Ed. (Adv.) 800 (1947), as 
an example of the extent of such protection, also note 24 infra. 
24. Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 58~, 63 Sup. Ct. 1200 (1943); West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63 Sup. Ct.. 
1178 (1943). 
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decisions rather than an expansion in the direction of upholding 
peacetime conscription. 
Civil Power Is Supreme over Military. 
Dean Roscoe . Pound in a recent address, lists "five charac-
teristics of our Anglo-American law ~ * * ( 1) * * * 
supremacy -of law * * * (2) subordination of the military 
to the civil power * * * (3) * * * emergencies do 
not suspend the constitution * * * ( 4) there are funda-
mental individual rights, guaranteed and protected by the con-
stitutions * * * ( 5) * * * the constitutions set up 
-and the courts maintain a separation of powers." l!5 We need not 
go back to English precedent, though persuasive .authority may 
also there be found. Our Declaration of Independence stated 
the eleventh justification for overthrowing a "government * * * 
destructive of these ends" for which "governments are instituted 
among men" as "he (it) has affected to render the military in-
dependent of, and superior to the civil power." It was "Lord 
Dunmore's proclamation declaring his intention to execute mar· 
tiallaw in that province" (Virginia) which caused the first rep-
resentative government to be created in this country.26 The 
change of wording in the proposed Constitution from "makr: 
war" to "declare war" was expressly for the purpose of "clog-
ging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace." 27 
The provision that no appropriation for military expenses should 
be for a longer period than two years was added to the constitu-
tion so that "the military shall always be subordinate to the civil 
power." 28 The debates in the constitutional convention reflected 
this attitude 29 and nearly every state in ratifying the constitution 
.25. Pound, War and the Law (1943) 14 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 110, 112-113. 
26. 1 Er.I.IOT'S DEBATES (1876) 52. 
27. DocuMENTARY HISTORY oF THE CoNSTITUTioN oF THE UNITED STATtS 
<>J! AMERICA (1894-1905) 553, 554; 1 ELI.IOT's DSBATES (1876) 246; 5 Ibid. 
443. 
28. 1 Er.r.10r's DEBATEs (1876) 249; 5 Ibid. 445; WARRSN, THE MAKING 
·OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928) 504-505. 
29. Note 27 supra; 5 Er.uoT's DSBAn:s (1876) 343, 443, 445, 447, 467, 511, 
544-5 ; 1 Ibid. 248-9, and 2 FARRAND, REcORDS oF THE Fr:nr:RAr. CoNVSNTIOX 
<>F 1787 (1937) 334, 341. 
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placed the same interpretation on the constitutional plan. 30 The 
New York ratification contains a typical statement : "at all times 
the military should be under strict subordination to the civil 
power." 31 From the earliest times, both in England 32 and in the 
United States,33 the courts refused to accept the decision of the 
milita-ry and insisted on making an independent ·decision of the 
necessity for any military action infringing individual liberties 
and consistently refused to permit military law and military au-
thority to be applied where civil law and civil authority was still 
operating. 34 
Other Rules of Interpretation. 
The Supreme Court has so often repeated the rule that war 
does not abolish constitutional protections and that emergency 
30. Rhode Island in its ratification declared: "at all times the military 
should be under strict subordin,ation to the civil power." 1 W AP.RF.N, op. cit. 
supra note 28, at 336. The whole history of the ratification of the Constitution 
is one of insistence upon the inclusion of a Bill of Rights, the fear that cen-
tral government would be too strong, the release of the militia from martial 
law except in time of war. Any opposition to these protections was n,ot based 
on their undesirability but on the assertion that under our system of delegated · 
powers no supremacy of the military, no infringement of basic rights, no 
usurpation of power could oceur. 1 ELUOT's D:EBAT£8 (1876) 325, 327, 334 ff.; 
2 Ibid. 32, 80, 123, 220, 251, 269, 316, 359, 398, 429, 435, 449, 455, 545 ff.; 
3 Ibid. 32, 317, 445, 449, 502, 649, 651, 660, are typical examples. See Mad-
ison's remarks, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., June 8, 1789; also WAP.RF.N, op. cit. supra 
note 28, at 508, 769. See also quoted statements in Cong. Record, appendix, 
vol. 86, pt. 17, pp. 5206 ff. by Lawyers Committee to Keep the United States 
out of War. CHAttt, FREt SPEECH IN '.l'Ht UNI'tED STAT£8 (1941) 30; 
"The first ten amendments were drafted by men who had just been through a 
war." Randall in CoNsnTUnoNAL PROBI.tMS UNDER LINCOI.N (1926) 26: 
"The law of military necessity, however, is not the typical American prin-
ciple. To say that military force is not to be restrained by the superior power 
of law, is to quote the militaristic view as against that which has always pre-
vailed here." 
Many of the state constitutions contain, provisions assuring the supremacy 
of the civil power. 
31. 1 Warren, op. cit. supra note 28, 237. 
32. The case of the Bristol Rights (S. T. U. S. III, 2-56), 1932, cited in 3 
WII.LOUGHBY, THt CoNsnTUnoNAL LAw oF THE UNITED STAT£8 (2d ed. 
1929) 1591. 
33. Mitchell v. Harmony, ·13 How. 115 (U. S. 1851). See also note 21 
supra. 
34. See note 21 supra and the recent case of Hammond v. Squier, 51 F. 
Supp. 227 (W. D. Wash., 1943). 
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cannot create power, that the question should by now be fore-
closed from debate. 35 
Although we could tr:ace from the very beginnings of our gov-
ernment the unflinching adherence to the rule that the federal 
government ~ no inherent but only delegated powers and must 
function within those delegated, it is only necessary to cite four 
recent decisions. 36 
35. E~ parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942); Schechter v. United 
States, 295 U. S. 495, 528, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 842 (1934); Home Building and 
Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1933); High-
lan,d v. Russell Car Co.; 279 U. S. 253, 261, 49 Sup. Ct. 314, 316 (1928) ; 
United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 88, 41 Sup. Ct. 298, 299 
(1920) ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. s: 146, 155, 40 Sup. 
Ct. 106, 108 (1919); E~ parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866). 
36. In United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936), the 
court said: 
"From the accepted doctrine that the United States is a government of 
delegated powers, it follows that those not expressly granted, or reason-
ably to be implied from such as are conferred, are reserved to the states 
or to the people. To forestall any suggestion to the con.trary, the Tenth 
Amendment was adopted. The same proposition, · otherwise stated, is 
that powers not ~ted are prohibited." 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 291, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936): 
"The proposition, often advanced and as often discredited, that the power 
of the federal government inherently extends to purposes affecting the 
nation, as a whole with which the states severally cannot deal or cannot 
adequately deal, and the related notion that Congress, entirely apart from 
those powers delegated by the Constitutipn, may enact laws to promote 
the general welfare, have never been accepted but always definitely re-jected by this court." · 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 528, 55 Sup. Ct. 
837 (1934): 
"Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the im-
posed ·limits because they believe that more or different power is n,ec-
essary." 
Home Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 425, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 
(1934): 
"Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted 
power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted 
or reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emer-
gency. Its grants of power to the Federal Government and its limitation,s 
of the power of the States were determined in the light of emergency 
and they are not altered by emergency. What power was thus granted 
and what limitations were thus imposed are questions which have always 
been, and always will be, the subject of close examination un,der our con-
stitutional system." 
· The nearest the Supreme Court has ever come to recognizing "inherent" 
power is U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U. S. 304, 57 Sup. 
C_t. 216 (1936), and that is a "delegated" and "incidental" power case. See 
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Other general principles of constitutional construction to be 
applied are fairly well agreed upon : the court attempts to place 
itself as nearly as possible in the position of the men who framed 
the instrument and to define powers in accordance with under-
lying. principles and purposes.37 To this end, references to the 
Federalist, the debates in the constitutional convention, the rati-
fications in the several states are helpful.38 But any particular 
person's view in debate is not of great moment, nor is any pro-
posed amendment, not ratified, unless. it be clear that more than 
a personal or minority point of view is represented. 39 Where no 
exceptions to a general pqwer are stated in the Constitution no~e 
will be found by mere implication or construction. Yet constitu-
tional provisions are of ~qual dignity; none must be disregarded 
and none must be so enforced as to nullify or substantially im-
pair . .other provisions.40 Whether the framers of the Constitution 
were or were not familiar with a certain subject matter is not 
determinative of the application of constitutional ~rovisions 
thereto.41 
Patterson, In re the United States v. Curtis Wright Corporation (1944) 22 
TEX. L. Rsv. 286; Quarles, Federal Government: as to Foreign Affairs, Arc 
Its Powers Inherent as Disti1~guished from Delegated? (1944) 32 GF:o. L. J. 
375; BtARD, T~ REPUBLIC (1943) 273 for severe criticisms of the "inh_erent 
power" dictum of this case. 
37. Re Bain, 121 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. ·781 (1886); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 
Pet. 539 (U. S. 1842) ; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819) ; 
Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pel 410 (U. S. 1830) ; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 
U. S. 452, 52 Sup. Ct. 420 (1931) ; Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 
21 Sup. Ct. 648 (1900). 
38. Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (U.S. 1821); Wheeling., P. & C. Transp. 
Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273 (1878) ; E~ parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 45 
Sup. Ct. 332 (1924); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 
1819); Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 431, 
63 Sup. Ct. 409, 412 (1943). 
39. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448 (1899) ; United States 
v Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct. 456 (1897). 
40. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824) ; Rhode Island v. Massa-
chusetts, 12 Pet. 657 (U. S. 1838) ; Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 
Sup. Ct. 21 (1926); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 
(1935); Wright v. Un.ited States, 302 U. S. 583, 58 Sup. Ct. 395 (1937) ; 
Dick v. United States, 208 U. S. 34fr, 28 Sup. Ct. 399 (1907) ; Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803). 
41. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031 (1940). 
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Cases on Conscription. 
The two cases which specifically upheld the constitutionality 
of wartime conscription are Kneedler v. Lane/2 a Pennsylvania 
case decided during the War between the States and the Selective 
Dmft Law Cases 43 of World War I. Other cases merely follow 
these; largely without reexamination of the issues and arguments. 
In the Kneedler case on the first hearing (temporary in junction) 
the court by a vote of 3 to 2 held conscription unconstitutional. 
The basis of the decision was : the federal government is a· gov-
ernment of delegated powers ; the Constitution must be taken as 
a whole and effect be given to every part; to grant power of gen-
eral conscription under the 13th clause of Art. I, Sec. 8, "to raise 
and support armies," would destroy the 16th and 17th clauses 
which prescribed when the militia could be called out and how 
they were to be trained; the background of the constitutional 
convention showed an intention to limit "the power to raise 
armies to (by) the ordinary English mode of voluntary enlist-
ments" ; it could not be claimed that the power "to provide and 
maintain a Navy" authorized the "press-gang''; the claimed 
power was contrary to the whole "nature or genius of the govern-
ment which the constitution formed"; if the power was "proper" 
it was not "necessary'', under the necessary and proper clause, 
for the militia had not been called out and voluntary enlistments 
had not been exhausted. These propositions had previously 
been forcefully stated by Daniel Webster in opposition to and 
defeat of an earlier plan of limited wartime conscription.44 
On a .second hearing, the constituency of the court having been 
changed by the election of Judge Agnew to replace Chief Justice 
Lowrie, the law was sustained, 3 to 2. Since Judge Agnew's 
42. 45 Pa. St. 238 (1863). 
43. 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159 (1917). I am not analyzing either 
Sugar v. U. S., 252 Fed. 74 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918), which contains a good con-
sideration of the same law or U. S. v. Olsen, 253 Fed. 233 (W. D. Wash., 
1917), a less satisfactory analysis. 
44. 14 WRITINGS AND SP:EECH~S oi DANttr. WSBSTtR 55-69. See also Chief 
Justice Chaney's opinion of the unconstitutionality of conscription, published 
by Philip G. Auchampaugh, University of Nevada in Tyler's Quarterly His-
torical and Genealogical M agazitle (1936), vol. XVIII, pp. 72-87; Rep. Chan-
dler and others speaking on. the amendment of the Conscription Act in 1865 ; 
' 37th Cong. 3rd Sess. 
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opinion was the deciding one his arguments should be examined. 
His reasoning runs thus : ( 1) there is a presumption of con-
stitutionality; (2) the power to "declare" war presupposes the 
right to "make" war which is an inherent power of all sovereign 
nations and this "inherently carries with it the power to coerce 
or drci.ft" ; ( 3) the clause, "to raise and support ·armies" is un-
limited; ( 4) power to draft must lie either in the Federal gov-
ernment or the State and since the State cannot use it for na-
tional purposes it must belong to the United States; ( 5) the 
militia power is an additional power subsidiary to the power to 
raise armies. But we have seen that there is no presumption of 
constitutionality of this type of law which cuts down individual 
civil liberties; the word "declare" was specifically substituted for 
"make" war in order to restrict the military power; even if we 
concede that in international law sovereign nations have the in-
herent power to raise armies by any means,45 yet we are consid-
ering the extent of the power of the state and of the federal gov-
ernment under a specific Constitution which deprives the federal 
goverument of all inherent power. As can thus be seen from other 
portions of this article, the judicial soundness of most of the prop-
ositions relied upon is open to considerable question and there 
is basis for saying that Lincoln thought of his action as calling 
out the militia.46 
It appears from the Kneedler case that the Pennsylvania court 
desired to have the case decided by the United States Supreme 
Court but that the government studiously avoided this.46 .. A more 
closely reasoned case was decided under the Constitution of the 
Confederacy in 1862, Jeffers v. Fair.46b Although this cannot be 
an authoritative interpretation of the federal constitution, the 
provisions considered are the same as in the United States Con-
stitution. The Court placed almost its entire reliance on the fact 
that "to raise and support armies was unqualified" and therefore, 
at least in wartime, was unrestricted by the militia clause. 
45. 3 VATT:F.L, THt LAw oF NATIONS, c. Z, sees. 8 & 9 (1916); Bmu,AYAQUI, 
Tn PRINCIPLES oF PoLITICAL LAw (Ed. 1791) Part IV, c. 1, Sec. XII. 
46. See notes 18, 27, 36, supra. 
46a. Perhaps because of Chief Justice Chaney's opinion referred to supra, 
note 44. 
46b. 33 Ga: 347 (1862). 
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The Selective Draft Law cases, although referring to the 
Kneedler case as controlling authority, completely reexamined the 
issue.47 There are som~ who find in the court's opinion the at-
titude which Shakespeare made famous in the words: "The lady 
doth protest too _much, methinks." For the court's argument is 
constantly advanced by this type of wording: "cannot conceive". 
"too frivolous for further notice", "so ·devoid of foundation", 
"not even a shadow of ground", "to do more than state ·the 
proposition is absolutely unnecessary", "unnecessary to follow", 
"wholly unnecessary to ~"'Cplore", "cannot be the slightest doubt", 
"it is indisputable", "fallacy of the argum~t", etc. Whether this 
be true or not, it is true that the court does not work out a con-
sistent interrelation of the various military powers set forth in 
the Constitution. The Court's reasoning may be outlined as 
follows : The colonies had the right to enforce military service; 
the states enforced military service ; one of the reasons for calling 
the Constitutional Convention was the inadequacy under the Con-
federation of depending on the states to fill military quotas; a 
state citizen can't volunteer for the federal army if he cannot also 
be drafted; the relation between the- militia clause and the .clause 
"to ·raise and support armies" was "there was left therefore un-
der the sway of the States undelegated the control of the militia 
to the extent that such control was not taken away by the exer-
cise by Congress of its power to raise armies;" "the power 
granted' to Congress to raise armies in its potentiality was sus-
ceptible of narrowing the area over which the militia clause 
operated," and that· the obligation of the citizens to the federal 
government was direct rather than through the states by virtue 
of the 14th amendment.47a 
Neither of these cases do, nor could they, pass on the peace-
47. Perhaps the court.did not have to pass on the broad constitutional ques-
tion, since the charge was refusal to register and it has been pointed out that 
a person may be required to register whether or not he could be conscripted: 
Stone v. Christensen, 36 F. Supp. 739, D. Ore. (1940)'; U. S. v. Rappeport, 
36 F. Supp. 915 S. D. N.Y. (1941), affd. ·120 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). 
47a. 245 U. S. 366, 378-383, 38 Sup. Ct. 159, 161-163 (1918). The ques-
tion whether a new "United States citizenship" was created by the 14th amend-
ment is a study in itself which will not be attempted here. Suffice it to say, 
I find nothing in the amendment, congressional debates, or decisions, to show 
an intention to create a federal militia power. 
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time conscription by the federal government of men, the draft-
ing of women, or the drafting of conscientious objectors. This 
last point was incidentally raised by the defendants in the S elec-
tive Draft Lmv cases, none of whom were conscientious object-
-ors, ,by asserting that discriminatory preference· was granted to 
-objectors. The government urged that the exemption was in 
furtherance of the right of religious freedom and apparently the 
.Court accepted this positiori: 
"The law neither establishes a religion nor prohibits its free 
exercise. Section 4 contains nothing respecting the estab-
lishment of religion; on the contrary, it goes so far as to 
aid in the free exercise of those religions which forbid par-
ticipation in war: * * * 
"Exemptions were allowed by every compulsory .service. law 
passed by the States. Quakers and conscientious objectors 
were frequently exempted in the Revolutionary War. (Cit-
ing many acts of the States)." 47b 
The 1940 selective service law might be considered (prior to 
Pearl Harbor) as peacetime conscription, though there is strong 
.authority in International Law that we were at war prior to 
October 1940, due to the acts of the President.48 Few cases arose 
prior to Pearl Harbor. Eight Union Theological students re-
fused to register, pleaded guilty, did not challenge the act and 
·were each sentenced to a year and a day.49 Later five young_ 
men refused to register, filed demurrers ·attacking the act's con-
.stitutionality, were tried and sentenced to eighteen months to two 
years each. 60 Several other cases followed. In all of the re-
ported cases, the courts, in upholding the conviction of persons. 
for refusing to register, either held that war existed though there 
47b. 245 U. S. at 374 (1918). 
48. Wright, When Does War Exist?. (1932) 26 Am. Jour. of Int. Law 
.362; McNair, The Legal Meaning of War, (1926) 11 Grotius Soc. Trans. 
29; Brierly, International Law and Resort to Armed Force, (1932) 4 Camb. 
L. J. 308; 1 Hackworth, Digest on International Law, State Dept., (1941), 
·660-663; 6 I d. 489-503; 7 Ibid. 390-396, 425-430, 488-503, 687-693, 703-5. -
49. N. Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1940, p. 1. 
50. N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1941, pp. 14, 15; N. Y. Herald Tribune, Decem-
'ber 4, 1940; Philadelphia Record, December 12, 1940; United States v. Rappe-
port, 36 F. Supp. 915 (S. D. N. Y., 1941), affd. 120 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 
2d, 1941). 
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was no "formal declaration of war" 51 or they held that the case 
involved only refusal to register, which could be compelled as a 
census in time of peace or war. 52 Those cases in which the charge 
was refusal to report for induction occurred after Pearl Harbor. 53 
Th~efore, non~ of these cases had to pass on the Constitution-
ality of peacetime conscription; yet, nearly every case contained 
an assertion of the validity of such conscription. We have pointed 
out elsewhere other dicta to the same effect. 
The Supreme Court has been careful in some cases upholding 
the broadest military powers in wartime, to caution that its words 
should not be extended to peacetime. 54 
It would seem that the right to use, in time .of war or after 
attack, federal troops-volunteer or conscript-abroad has been 
foreclosed by the courts. In Cox v. Wood,55 "petitioner, after 
affirming the validity of said Conscription Act of May 18, 
1917, pleads what he calls his constitu.tional immunity from mili-
51. United States v. Rappeport, supra note 50; United States v. Lambert, 
123 F. (2d) 395· (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); United States v. Cornell, 36· F. Supp. 
81 (D. Idaho 1940). 
52. United States v. Rappeport, supra note 50; Stone v. Christensen, supra 
note 47; United States v. Garst, 39 F. Supp. 367 (E. D. Pa., 1941). "Con-
gress undoubtedly has the power to seek ·information through registration or 
otherwise in peacetime in order to be prepared for the intelligent exercise of 
its power to raise armies by conscription even if its power to COII$cript can be 
exercised only in time of war." 36 F. Supp. at 917 (S. D. N. Y. 1941). 
53. See Annotation, 147 A. L. R 1185, 1313ff and subsequent annotations. 
54. Justice Cardoza, Hamilton v. Bd. of Regents, 293 U. S. 245, 55 Sup. Ct. 
197 (1934) : "There is no occasion at this time to mark the limits of gov-
ernmental. power in, the exaction of military service when the nation is at 
peace." 
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 622, 51 Sup. Ct. 570, 574 (1931) : 
"other drastic powers, wholly inadmissible in time of peace, exercised to meet 
the emergencies of war." 
55. 247 U. S. 3, 4, 6, 38 Sup. Ct. 421, 422 (1917). This position continues to 
be asserted, however; see record and brief, Pacman v. U. S., 144 F. (2d) 562 
(C. C. A. 9th, 1944), cert. filed U. S. Supreme Court, October 1944. A dis-
tinction has been recognized between the emergency preceding war when. serv-
ice is restricted within the United States and possessions, 50 U. S. C. A. § 
303 (e) (Supp. 1943) and war when territorial restrictions are abolished, 50 
U. S. C. A. § 731 (Supp. 1943). Also the right to "drive back" as part of 
"repel" was early advanced, 4 ELuOT's DEBAn:s (1876) 459: "If it became 
necessary for the executive to call out the militia to repel invasion, he thought 
they might pursue the enemy beyond the limits, until the invaders were ef-
fectively dispersed." 
1944] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PEACETIME CONSCRIPTION 59 
tary service beyond the territorial limits of the United States." 
The Court held that there was no such immunity. In so holding 
it stated that the power "to compel military service * * * 
derived from the authority * * * to declare war and to 
raise armies" which was "not qualified or restricted by the pro-
visions of the militia clause." Whether this reasoning is sound 
or not, the court could also have upheld service abroad under the 
provisions of the militia clause on the ground that "to repel" in-
cludes to "drive back" and that "invasion" included attack upon 
our ships which international law recognizes as "floating islands." 
These cases, then, constitute the United States Supreme Court's 
present outline of the powers of conscription. 
Background of the Constitutional Provisions. 
At the beginning of this article we set forth the constitutional 
provisions from which federal authority or lack of authority to 
compel peacetime conscription must be found. One misappre-
hension, entertained by far too many people, should be dispelled-
that is that the words : "to provide for the common defense and 
general welfare of the United States" constitute a granting of a 
power to the federal government. 56 These words are found only 
in the Preamble and in Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1 which grants federai 
taxing and spending powers. The cases are clear, and constitu-
tional authorities are agreed that the Preamble creates no power 
and these words in Article I constitute limitations on the govern-
ment's money raising and spending_power, not grants.57 
We have pointed out that in our system of government the 
civil is supreme over the military, that our Constitution sought 
to clog war "making" and that we must determine the meaning 
and interrelation of all the provisions in the Constitution relating 
to war and the military. 
56, Even the Lawyers Committee to Keep the United States out of \Var 
cited this as a source of Congressional war power. See 86 Cong. Rec. (March, 
1940) appendix, pt./17, 5206 ff. 
57. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 12 (1936) ; Helvering 
v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 57 Sup. Ct. 904 (1937); United States v. Boyer, 85 
Fed. 425, 432 (W. D. Mo., 1898), quoting Story on the Constitution. See 
the excellent specific discussion by Madison, FARRAND, TH~ Rr;coRos oF TH~ 
Fr;or;RAr, CoNVJ>NTION (1937) 483-494; Gebelein, Inc. v. Milbc-urn,e, 12 F. Supp. 
105 (D. Md. 1935) ; The Federalist No. XLI. 
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(a) Standing Armies. 
One of the grievances set forth in our Declaration of Inde-
pendence as a justification for overthrowing government was : 
'·He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies * * *" 
In England there had been a long opposition to standing armies. 
They were condemned in the Petition of Right in 1628 and the 
Bill of Rights ; they were branded as dangerous and contrary to 
the theory of government in Blackstone's Commentaries on the 
Laws of England. Parliament had developed the militia system 
and disbanded in peacetime the whole King's army.58 We in-
herited and carried on this opposition in the United States. The 
continental army of 10,000 was furloughed by Congress within 
two months after the war ended, even though a British army was 
still in the country and it had already violated the treaty of 
peace. ;;g In the Constitutional Convention no voice was raised to 
defend a large standing army; even those who spoke for greater 
military power merely desired a small volunteer army or a well 
organized militia. Madison, in urging the states to federate and 
not to fall apart, did so on the basis that it would prevent large 
standing armies : 
"In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are con-
stantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant appre-
hension of War, has the same tendency to render the head 
too large for the body. A standing military force, with an 
overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to 
liberty. The means of defence agst. foreign danger, have 
been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among 
the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, when-
ever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the 
armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved 
the people." 60 
Several attempts were made to limit the stand~ng army to two 
58. 1 BI.AcKS'tONt, CoMM~TARIES (15th ed., 1809) 408 ff.; 3. MAY, CoN-
STITUTIONAl. HISTORY OF ENGI.AND (1912 ed.) 281; 1 LECKY, HISTORY OF ENG-
I.AND IN THE 18TH CENTURY (5th ed., 1891) 508. 
59. 5 Eu.IoT's DtBATES (1876) 87, 89, 90. Congress was quick to put an 
end to enlistments as soon as the Massachusetts "rebellion" was ended. Ibid. 
94, 99. 
60. 1 FARRAND, THE REcoRDs oF THE FtnERAr. CoNVENTION (1937) 465. 
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th02tsand. 61 The first voice heard upon the discussion of the 
military power was Mr. Gerry's "against standing armies in time 
of peace * * * The people were jealous on this head." 62 
The last voices to speak on the military power, Col. Mason, Mr. 
Randolph, Mr. Madison, were: 
"sensible that an absolute prohibition of standing armies in 
time of peace might be unsafe, and wish ( ed), at the same 
time, to insert something pointing out and guarding against 
the danger of them." 68 
At this time a provision to preface the militia clause (Art. I, Sec. 
8) reading "and that the liberties of the people may be better 
secured against the danger of standing armies in time of peace," 
was reject~d "as setting a dishonorable mark of distinction on 
the military class of citizens." 
Although there was general agreement with the basic plan 
for a small army, it was recognized that "a standing force of 
some sort may * * * become unavoidable," and that "limit-
ing the appropriation of revenue (might be) the best guard in 
this case." 64 This was an acceptance of the point of view of Mr. 
Pinckney who introduced a resolution that "no troops shall be 
kept up in time of peace, but by consent of the Legislature" 65 and 
that of Hamilton, strongly stated in the Federalist, that the pro-
tection against peacetime standing armies had been and could be 
best lodged in the legislature. 66 
It appears therefore that, while this did not meet the whole 
61. 5 EwO'l''s DSBATES (1876) 443. Other limitations proposed but rejected 
will be found in Z FARRAND, THE Rr:coRDs oF THE Fr:ntR4r. CoNYr:N'tiON (1937) 
323, 329, 330, 333, 563, 616, 617, 640, 4 Ibid~ 59. 
62. 5 Er.uOT"s DEBA'tr:S (1876) 443. 
63. 5 Ibid. 442-4. 
64. 5 Ibid. 544, 545. And "Madison was in, favor of it. It did not restrain 
Congress from establishing a military force in time of peac~, if found nec-
essary; and as armies in time of peace are allowed, on all hands, to be an, 
evil,· it is well to discountenance them by the Constitution, as far as will con-
sist with the essential power of the govern.ment on that head." 
65. Z FARRAND, THE Rr:coRns oF THE Fr:DERAI. CoNvr:N't~ON (1937) 341. 
66. The Federalist, No. XXVI, No. XXIV. Hamilton, the most consist-
ent advocate of strong federal powers, favored "a certain portion of military 
force" yet seemed to fear too much use of "a federal stan,ding army." 1 
FARRAND, THE Rr:coRDS oF THE Fr:oERAr. CoNYr:N'l'ION (1937) 285; Z Er.uO'l''s 
DEBATES (1876) 232-3. 
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opposition of all members, the provision "but no appropriation 
of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years" 
was added to the phrase "to raise and support armies" as some 
"restriction on the number and continuance of an army in time 
of peace." 67 • 
When the Constitution was submitted to the states for ratifica-
tion each convention recorded its opposition to- any interpretation 
which would permit large federal standing armies. 08 Nearly 
every state attached interpretations or conditions to their rati-
fication of the Constitution to prevent large standing armies and 
some even demanded amendment.69 Mr. Randolph addressed 
the House of Representatives on January 5, 1800 and obtained 
a reduction of the standing army (which was not over 3000 men). 
"I suppose the establishment of a standing army in the country 
not only a useless and enormous expense, but, upon the 
67. 5 ELuOT's DSBATES (1876) 510-11; 2 FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 29, 
509. 
68. Typical expressions from the State Debates are collected in Cong. Rec. 
appendix, vol. 86, pt. 17, pp. 5206 ff. 
Massachusetts : General Tlwmpsol~, "Keep your militia in order-we don't 
want standing armies." 
Mr. Nason: "Suffer me, Sir,~to say a few words on the fatal effects of 
standing· armies, that bane of republican govern,ments. * * *" 
Virginia: George Mason, "But when once a standing army is established 
in any country the people lose their liberty." 
Madiso11: "A standing army is· one of the greatest mischiefs that can pos-
l:tibly happen." 
Governor Randolph: "With respect to a standing army, I believe there was 
not a member in, the federal convention who did not feel indignation at such 
an institution." 
Similar remarks were made by Patrick Henry, Mr. Dawson and others. 
69. Cong. Rec. appendix, vol. 86, pt. 17, pp. 5206 ff. 
New Hampshire: "no standing army shall be kept up in time of peace, un-
less with the consent of three-fourths of the members of each branch of 
Congress. * * *" 
New York: "standing armies in time of peace, are dangerous to· liberty, 
and ought not to be kept up, except in cases of necessity. * * *" 
North Carolina: "no standing army or regular troops shall be raised or 
kept up, in time of peace without the consent of two-thirds of the Senators 
and Representatives." 
Rhode Island : "standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, 
and ought not to be kept up, except in cases of necessity." 
Most State Constitutions contained provisions against standing armies. 
These generally left the protection to the legislatures. The Federalist No. 
XXIV, footnote. 
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ground of the Constitution, the spirit of that instrument 
and the genius of a free people are equally hostile to this 
dangerous institution, which ought to be resorted to (if at 
all) only in extreme cases of difficulty and danger, * * *70 
From the foregoing it is clear that it cannot be contended that 
there is a constitutional proscription of standing armies or even 
that there is a specific constitutional limitation on their size. The 
people entrusted their protection against large standing armies 
in time of peace to their legislature with as strong instructions 
as could be made that the legislators should use the power of the 
purse to keep the army small. If therefore the legislature should 
authorize too large a peacetime standing army, this would not 
be a specific constitutional breach but at most a violation by the 
legislators of their oath. (Constitution, Art. VI) How large 
is a "small" army? There were 10,000 troops at the close of the 
Revolution-these were practically all furloughed and later dis-
charged. In 1898 the army was composed of 25,000 men; in 
1910 the regular army numbered 83,000; in 1920 about 298,000; 
in 1930 approximately 130,750; in 1940, existing 255,000-to be 
built to 375,000-plus 230,000 national guard. These compare 
with standing armies in Germany (1937) 556,000; Ru~sia 
(1932) 562,000, and Japan (1936) 260,000.71 
(b) The State Militia. 
Our forefathers did more than face the problem of standing 
armies and record their opposition thereto; they attempted to 
work out alternatives. 
The history of the Continental Congress and of the Confedera-
tion and the reason which dictated a change of form are so well 
known as to require no citation. Congress had no authority to 
compel the furnishing of troops or money. It could fix quotas 
for the colonies or States and request that they fill these. That 
the States had not done. It was therefore proposed to give the 
federal government some additional power in those fields. · On 
70. 4 ELLIOT's D~BATES (1876) 441. 
71. Reliance has been placed on League of Nations Armammt Yearbook; 
BOND, OuR MILITARY POLICY (1932) ; WALDROP, MAcARTHUR ON WAR (1942) ; 
CHAMB~RLIN, SovrET RussiA (1930). There is at present no statutory limita-
tion on the size of the Army: 50 U. S. C. A. § 762 (Supp. 1942). 
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August. 20, 1870, General Washington wrote the President of 
·Congress strongly pointing out that the existing plan had pro-
vided an inadequate supply of men and materials.72 In 1781 he 
wrote to John Park Curtis (Virginia) : 73 
"The great business of war can never be well conducted, if it 
can be conducted at . all, while the. powers of Congress are 
only recommendatory; while one State yields obedience and 
another refuses it,. while a third mutilates and adopts the 
measure in part only, and all vary in time and manner,***" 
'The first plan submitted, May 29, 1787, the "Randolph Resolu-
·.tions" contained this reference : 
. . 
"that the National Legislature ought to be impowered * * * 
to call forth the forces of the Union agst. any member of 
the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles 
thereof." 74 
This was followed· by the Pinckney plan. As submitted to the 
convention it authorized the legislature : 
"To raise armies; To build and equip fleets; To pass laws for 
arming, organizing, and disciplining the militia of the United 
States." and "To call forth the aid of the militia' to execute 
the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrec-
tion and repel invasion." 75 
Had these provisions been adopted rather than those later em-
bodied in the Constitution, and had the provision "to tnake war" 
remained, and had no qualifi-cation been placed alongside "to 
raise armies," it might have'been clear that the federal govern-
ment had authority to call forth (draft, conscript) the federal 
militia (complete United States manpower) and. place them in 
.armies. For, by definition, the creation of a federal militia would 
Jtave ·made all American citizens liable to federal military service. 
But even then it would have been extremely difficult to argue 
that the right could be exercised for other than the four enu-
merated purposes or that the men could be trained other than 
.as a "militia." A constitutionally consistent plan under the 
72. Vn.r:s, G~RGS WASHINGTON, L~s AND ADDR£SSJ>S (1909) 215. 
73. 7 SPARK'S, WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON (1833-1837) 442. 
74. 1 FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 29, 21. 
15. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBA'ti>S (1876) 130. 
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Pinckney proposal would have had to interpret the power "to 
raise armies" and the power to organize and call forth "the militia 
of the United States" together. This could only have been done 
by recognizing three rules : 
( 1) All able bodied men, not exempt, are liable to federal 
military training and service (definition of militia). 
(2) These men could be compelled to serve only for the four 
stated purposes. 
( 3) But armies could be raised by any other method than 
compulsion, and used for the four stated purposes or 
otherwise. 
It is of paramount importance to examine the Convention 
record to determine whether this first proposal for federal power 
was extended or restricted. 
No one knew better than Washington, who had urged broad 
federal powers, that the power had been definitely restricted. In 
the letter, approved by the Convention, by which Washington 
transmitted the Constitution as finally adopted, he said: 
"The friends of our country have'· long seen and desired that 
the power of making war, peace, and treaties; that of levy-
ing money and regulating commerce; and the correspondent 
executive and judicial authorities, shall be fully and effect-
ually vested in the general government of the Union. But 
the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one 
body of men is evident. Thence results the necessity of a 
different organization." 76 
At no point was this change more marked than with. regard 
to the military powers, and particularly the militia. In the long 
debates it became clear that there was not and was not to be such 
a thing as a United States militia (general manpower obligated 
to military service) ; that the militia was to be that of the states 
and under major control by the states.77 Even a resolution to 
76. 1 ELLIO'l''s D;eBAT$ (1876) 305; the changes can even be seen by com-
paring the amendments in the Committee on Detail: Z FARRAND, op. cit. supra 
note 29, 135, 143-45, 158-9, 167-9, 3 Ibid. 607. 
77. U. S. CoNST. Art. I, Sec. 8, cL 17; U. S. CoNST. Art. II, Sec. 2, "The 
President shall be Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." This is 
recognized in R 0. T. C. Manual, 2nd year adv;;mced, Vol. IV, c. 1921-26. 
George Washington continued to refer to "the militia of the U. S." in a com-
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give the federal government power to "make laws for the regu-
lation and discipline of the militia of the several states, reserving 
to the states the appointment of the officers" "went too far." 78 
A proposal reserving to the states only the right to appoint "offi-
cers under the :rank of general officers" called forth a blistering 
attack as "absolutely inadmissible" so that the resolution was not 
even seconded.79 All reference to a United States militia was 
dropped and the militia was definitely referred to as that of 
the states. 
Although all agreed that the states would not surrender up the 
militia, it was recognized that some uniformity of organization 
a.nd arms was desirable. 80 When the present provision was sub-
mitted to the Convention by the committee of eleven, Mp.dison 
urged this militia plan : "as the greatest danger to liberty is from 
standing armies, it is best to prevent them by an effective provi-
sion for a good militia." 81 Immediately following this the present 
constitutional provision was adopted, but only after Mr. King, 
a member of the committee, had set down on the record the in-
tended extent of the federal authority: 
"by way of explanation, said, that by organizing, the commit-
tee meant, proportioning the officers and men-by armin,q, 
specifying the kind, size, and calibre of arms-and by dis-
ciplining, prescribing the manual exercise; evolutions, &c." 
munication to Congress, August 7, 1789; 30 SPARKS, WRI'l'INGS oF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON (1833-1837) 372. And General Marshall seems to fall into the 
same error as 'Jifashington in justification for conscription. (82 Army & 
Navy Jounzal 32.) 
78. 5 Eu.IoT's DI-:BAn:s (1876) 443. 
79. Ibid. 466. 
80. Ibid. 443-445; 2 FARRAND, op. cit. supra 119te 29, 324, 326, 331, 332. 
81. 5 EU.IOT's DI-:BA'n:S (1876) 466-7. Govenior Randolph made even clearer 
the importance of the state militia as a compromise between no defence and the 
creation of large federal armies : 
"With respect to a standing army, I believe there was not a member in 
the federal convention who did not feel indiguation at such an institution. 
~at remedy then could be provided ?-Leave the country defenceless? 
In order to provide for our defence, and exclude the dangers of a stand-
ing army, the general defence is left to those who are the objects of 
defence. It is left to the militia who will suffer if they become the in-
strumen,ts of tyranny. The general government must have power to call 
them forth when the general defence requires it In order to produce 
greater security, the state governments are to appoint the officers." 3 FAR-
RAND, op. cit. supra n. 29, 319. See WAI.DROP, MAcARTHUR ON WAR 
(1942) 91-92. 
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"added to his former explanation, that arming meant not only 
to provide for uniformity of arms, but included the author-
ity to regulate the modes of furnishing, either by the militia 
themselves, the state governments, or the national treasury; 
that .laws for disciplining must involve penalties and every 
thing necessary for enforcing penalties." 82 
It therefore appears that the first rule which we stated as deduci-
ble from the Pinckney proposal was denied to the federal gov-
ernment and recognized in the states : 
1. Only to the states do the able-bodied men owe the obliga-
tion of military training and service (militia) except as they 
are called into the federal service for the three purposes 
enumerated. 
(a.) The Phrase, "To Raise * * * Armies" 
Leaving out of account the relation of the power to the militia 
provisions, there is some evidence that the authority "to raise 
and support armies" was considered to be unrestricted (at least 
as to numbers) ; other evidence points to the power being limited 
to recruitment by voluntary enlistment (except as the militia 
could be ealled). Hamilton, strongest advocate of unlimited 
federal power, in the FederalistJ No. XXIII said: "These powers 
(including raising armies) ought to exist without limitation." 
He went on, in the same paper, to interpret the provision as au-
thorizing raising armies "in the customary and ordinary modes 
practised in other governments." There is strong implication in 
the Federalist No. XXVI that in time of peace Hamilton did not 
have in mind anything but volunteers for he said : 
"an army, so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could 
only be formed by progressive augmentations." 
Since, if conscription is possible, the army could be raised to any 
size at one time, his argument assumes progressive enlistment 
controlled by successive Congresses' power of purse. At another 
point Hamilton seems to speak for an indefinite power to raise 
troops in war or peace, yet inunediately follows it by a condem-
nation of a large army which "may be fatal." 82a 
82. 5 ELLIOT'S D~BATES (1876) 464-5. 
82a. The Federalist, No. XLI. 
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There is no reference, either in the debates or in the writings 
of those who urged an unlimited interpretation of the power "to 
raise armies" to suggest that they had in mind or intended to 
urge conscription. Nor is there ~ny clear cut reference to restrict-
ing the power ~o voluntary enlistments. But it is reasonably 
certain from a thorough reading that they were urging only two 
points : that the power should apply in peace as well as war; that 
there should be no specific limitation of numbers to be enlisted. 83 
Hamilton's suggestion that the power embraced "the custom-
ary and ordinary modes practised, in other governments" is 
worth considering. The ·question arises: practiced when? At 
the time the words were included in the Constitution or when 
the exercise of the power is later challenged? In 1787 or in 
1944? By 1917 nearly all countries ~ployed .wartime conscrip-
tion; 84 by 1939 about one-half the countries had peacetime con-
scription, though none of the Anglo-American democracies em-
ployed it. 85 I think it would be generally agreed that we are 
trying to discover the practice in 1787 so as to discover the m~­
ing attached by the framers of the Constitution. The authority 
on conscription, Captai11 Elbridge Colby, points out that con· 
scription did not exist in 1787 : 
''We must look upon conscription * * * as something 
characteristieally modern · * * * occurred for the first 
time in France * * * · September 5, 1798." 86 
He distinguishes conscription from the old fet. .ial levies, the 
French "milice" and the British and American militia. In 1704 
83. The Federalist XXIII, XXVI, XLI. Pinckney's speech, which ap-
peared in pamphlet form, was never fully delivered and cannot be considered 
to reflect the views of. delegates ; 3 Farrand, op. cit. supra note 29, 106, 116, 
118-9. Mr. Martin's report to the Maryland legislature is often referred to as 
proving unlimited federal power: "Congress have also the power. given thein 
to raise and support armies, without any limitation as to numbers, and with-
out any restriction in time of peace." (Ibid. 207.) This is part of an impas-
sioned speech to get Maryland to reject the Constitution. 
84. See list in Selective Draft Law Cases at p. 378, op. cit., supra, n,ote 43. 
85. Great Britain, Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United States; 
see League of Nations, Armament Year Book, 1938 and 1939-40. 
86. "Conscription in Modem Form," The Infantry Journal, June 1929. See 
also his articles in the Encyclopedia of the Social Scien,ces and the Encyclo-
pedia Brittannica. 
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and 1707 attempts to compel military service were rejected by 
the British Parliament as unconstitutional. In 1756, 1757, 1778, 
1779 criminals, "idle and disorderly persons" were pressed into 
British service as punishment. 87 Even these acts ·were severely 
criticised in England and were objected to in our Declaration of 
Independence. 88 "When voluntary enlistments fell short of the 
proposed numbers ( duriJ;J.g the American Revolution), the de-
ficiencies were, by the laws of the several states, to be made up 
by draft or lots from the militia." 89 It would therefore appear 
that the plan adopted by the constitutional convention was not 
standing armies, not conscript or impressed armies but the dis-
tinctly Anglo-American militia system (in the United States, 
State-militia system). 
The only Supreme Court case to consider fully the ~ilitia and 
its relation to the army, United States v. Miller,90 states: 
"The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and 
train is set in contrast with Troops which they were forbid-
den to keep without the consent of Congress. The senti-
ment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the 
common view was that adequate defense of country and laws 
could be secured through the Militia-civilians primarily, 
soldiers on occasion. 
"The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from 
the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of 
Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commen-
tators. These show plainly enough that the Militia com-
prised all males physically capable of acting in concert for 
the common defense. 'A body of citizens enrolled for mili-
tary discipline.' And further, that ordinarily when called 
for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms 
supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at 
the time.'' 
Federal legislation has always drawn a distinction between 
87. 4 Anne. Ch. 10; 29 Geo. 2, Ch. 4; 30 Geo. 2, Ch. 8; 18 Geo. 3, Ch. 53.; 
19 Geo. 3, ch. 10. 
88. Declaration of Independence ; 1 L:t:CKY, HISTORY oF ENGLAND IN THE 
18TH CENTURY (1891) 500 ff. 
89. 2 RAMS:t:Y'S LIFE OF WASHINGTON (1807) 246; other authorities are 
found in United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 59 Sup. Ct. 816 (1938) and 
the briefs filed therein. 
so. 307 U. S. 174, 179, 59 Sup. Ct. 816, 818 (1938). 
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·"armies" (volunteers under the power to raise armies) and 
"national forces" or militia (all able bodied citizens )-see foot-
note 102. 
History of State Militia--Federal Organizing, Arming, 
· Disciplining. 
The relationship of the states and the federal government to 
the militia was well understood. Both began acting in accord-
ance with the theory of supremacy of the state and restriction of 
the federal supervision to the above stated matters. On April 
4, 1786, New York enacted a law "That every able-bodied Male 
Person, being a Citizen of this State * * *· (except such 
Persons as are hereinafter excepted)" should be a part of her 
militia, should furnish certain arms, etc. Massachusetts pro-
vided for the composition of her militia at the January Session in 
1784. Virginia soa did likewise in. October 1785. These militia 
or compulsory military service laws granted exemptions to those 
who could not participate in war because of religious beliefs.91 
The power of the States thus to compel military service, subject 
to these exemptions has been upheld.92 
In December 1790 Congress considered the first Militia bill. 
One of the questions was who had the real control of the militia 
and who could grant exemptions-all agreed that the states had 
major control because the militia belonged to the state.98 When 
the Militia act was passed in 1792 it therefore provided for 
"exemptions as the legislatures of the several states shall pro-
vide." 94 Other similar statutes followed. All of these recog-
nized the militia . as a state organization, composed of the male 
citizens "of the respective States" with the exceptior.t of those 
persons "who are exempted by the laws of the respective States." 95 
90a. 12 Hening's Statutes. 
91. 445 U. S. 366, 375, 38 Sup. Ct. 159, 165 (1917). 
92. State v. Wheeler, 141 N. Car. 773, 53 S. E. 358 (1906) ; Peo. e:r rei . 
. German Ins. Co. v. Williams, 145 Ill. 573, 33 N. E. 849 (1893) ; Lanahan v. 
Birge, 30 CoiUJ. 438 (1862); In re Dassler, 35 Kan. 678, 12 Pac. 130 (1886). 
93. 4 Er.uOT's DUATES (1876) 422-4, 438. 
94. 1 STAT. 271 (1792). 
95. Act of Apr. 30, 1810, c. 37; Act of Apr. 18, 1814, c. 80; Act of Apr. 
20, 1816, c. 64; Act of May 12, 1820, c, 97.; Act of Mar. 19, 1836, c. 44; Act 
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When Secretary of War Knox, on January 18 and 21, 1790, 
·proposed a federal militia on the theory that all men owed a 
"military duty for the defense of the state" 96 his plan was not 
·only rejected in Congress, but Rhode Island, which had not yet 
·a·atified the constitution, recommended an amendment : "that no 
·person shall be compelled to do military duty, otherwise than by 
·voluntary enlistment, except in case· of general invasion * * *" 91 
The first proposal of a conscription law in 1815 not only called 
forth Daniel Webster's attack resulting in the defeat of the bill, 
to which reference has been made, but it also brought repre-
·sentatives from various states together in the Hartford Conven-
tion where it was declared : 
"The power of compelling the militia and other citizens of 
the United States, by a forcible draft or conscription, to 
serve in the regular armies, as proposed in a late official 
letter of the secretary of war, is not delegated to Congress 
by the constitution: and the exercise of it would be not less 
dangerous to their liberties than hostile to the sovereignty 
of the states. The effort to deduce this· power from the right 
of raising armies is a flagrant attempt to pervert the sense 
of the clause in the constitution, which confers that right, 
and is incompatible with other provisions in that instru-
ment. The armies of the United States have always been 
raised by contract, never by conscription, and nothing more 
can be wanting to a government possessing the power thus 
claimed, to enable it to usurp the entire control of the militia, 
in derogation of the authority of the state, and to convert 
it by impressment into a standing army." 98 
Gradually the states abandoned the enrollment of militiamen 
and did not enforce their compulsory service laws. New York 
in 1846 exempted everyone from service on payment of a fee. 
The states had come to believe that the organized militia (na-
tional guard), supported solely by voluntary enlistment, was 
sufficient. This "breakdown" of the militia system and the in-
ability to induct the organized militia into the federal forces are 
of July 29, 1861, c. 25; Act of Mar. 2, 1867, c. 145; Rev, Stat. of 1878, Ch. 
XVI; Act of Jan. 21, 1903, c. 196, 32 Stat. L. 775. 
96. 7 NIUS's ReG. 296. 
97. 1 ELUOT's Dr:uAn>s {1876) 372. 
98. 7 NIUS's ReG. 307. 
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given by Adjutant General Louis Stotesbury as the reasons for 
the federal sel~ctive service legislation. 99 But this abandonment 
of enrollment and use of volunteering by the states could not ex" 
tend federal powers. In fact this very situation was foreseen in 
the Constitutio~l Convention and one of the proposals rejected 
read: "when states neglect to provide regulations for militia, it 
should be regulated and established by the legislature of the 
United States." 100 It may be that the United States, under its 
power of organizing, arming and disciplining could provide that 
regular registrations be made, and that a certain amount of drill 
in a certain manual of arms be given. 
History-Calling Forth the State Militia. 
From the beginning, a second type of law was also enacted 
by Congress, not under its power to organize the militia, but 
under·, its power to call out the militia, for the purpose of 
enforcing law, suppressing insurrection, repelling invasion. The 
act of February 28, 1795, provided: "That whenever the 
United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of in-
v~ion from any forei~ nation or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful 
for the President of the United States to call forth such number 
of the militia of the state, or states * * * as he may judge 
necessary to repel sue~ invasion:" 101 This was the form of au-
thorization used even during the War Between the States until 
the act of March 3, 1863, c. 75 which was hermaphroditic: ex" 
pressed to be in fulfillment of "the duty of the government to 
suppress insurrection and rebellion", thus fitting into the power 
to call forth the militia, but containing a new provision that all 
citizens between twenty and forty-fiv~ "are hereby declared to 
constitute ·the national forces and shall be liable to perform mili-
tary duty in the service of the United States when called by the 
President." 102 A similar provision was enacted in 1898 and 
99. N. Y. Times, p. 14, July 15, 1940. 
100. 5 Ewor's D£BAn:s (1876) ·443, 465. 
101. Act of Feb. 28, 1795, c. 36, 1 STAT. 424. See also: Act of May 9, 
1794, c. 27; Act of June 24, 1797, c. 4; Act _of Mar. 3, 1803, ·c. 32; Act of 
Apr. 18, 1806, c. 32; Act of Mar. 30, 1808, c. 39; Act of Apr. 10, 1812, c. 
55; Act of July 17, 1862, c. 201. 
102. Under this statute men were conscripted during the latter part of the 
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remains in force today.103 These provisions would seem to at-
tempt to create a federal "militia" in direct opposition to the de-
cision reached in 1787 that there was to be no such militia.104 No 
authoritative case has passed upon their constitutionality since 
the only question which has come before the courts is the power 
to- compel military service in wartime. In 1863 the provisions 
drafting men for military service were a part of this type of stat-
ute, in 1917 and 1940 they were' completely separate.105 
History-Raising and Regulating the Army. 
As we have seen, there are three interrelated federal powers: 
( 1 ) providing for organizing, arming and disciplining the state 
militia, (2) calling out the militia and (3) raising and regulating 
the Army and Navy. We have discussed elsewhere the restric-
tions on the power to raise armies. It is now only important to 
examine the expanding concept of "armies", as appears from 
federal laws, and to determine the extent to which the federal 
government has maintained the distinction between "armies" and 
"national forces" or "militia." 106 It can be seen from the statutes 
civil war and this power was upheld (footnote 42). The draft riots and gen,-
eral opposition to the Act are well known. Its inefficiency is attested by the 
fact that 2,435,028 union troops were volunteers, only 255,373 were conscripted 
and of these only 50,663 personally served. 
108. Act of Apr. 22, 1898, c. 187, 30 STAT. 361; 10 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1927) ; 
32 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1928) ; see footnote 106. 
104. See s11Pra notes 69-75. Note that if all these provisions operate every 
adult male is (1) a part of the state militia (Act of Jan. 21, 1903, c. 196, 32 
STAT. L. 775) and (2) of the federal militia (32 U. S. C. A. 1) and (3) of the 
national forces (Act of Apr. 22, 1898, c. 187, 30 STAT. 361 and 10 u. s. c. A. 
1). Note also that a distinction is drawn between "armies" and "national 
forces" (militia)-10 U. S. C. A. sees. 1 and 2; 32 U. S. C. A. sec. 1. 
There is some evidence of a deliberate attempt to eliminate state control 
of the militia. See EDMUNDS, TH:e MxuTARIZA'l'ION OF THE Umn;:n STAT$, 
10-12. 
105. Act of May 18, 1917, c. 15, 40 STAT. 76; Act of Sept. 16, 1940, c. 720, 
54 STAT. 885. 
106. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, c. 25: the military establishment created the 
year before "is hereby recognized to be the establishment for the troops in 
the service of the United States." 
Act of May 28, 1798, c. 47: authorized the President "in the even,t of a 
declaration of war against the United States, or of actual invasion of their 
territory, by a foreign power, or of imminent danger of such invasion * * * 
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set forth in the footnote, constituting as they do a quick outline 
of the federal law, that the term "army'' did not originally, and: 
has not even now come to include the process by which the gen-
eral manpower of the country are subjected to military duty. Bitt 
the provisions prescribing general military service duty do at-
tempt to create a federal militia in contravention of the intend--
ment of the Constitution. · 
The Consoientious Objector and the Draft. 
One final point remains-to analyze the constitutional relation 
of "conscience" to the drafting of men for military service and 
training.107 It has been stated in several dicta, both by the Su-
to cause to be enlisted, and to call into actual service, a number of troops, not 
exceeding ten thousand non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates. * * o~o 
Act of Feb. 2, 1901, c. 192, 31 STAT. 748; by this time it was provided: 
"That from and after the approval of this Act the Army of the United States~ 
including the existing organizations shall consist of * * *" (here follows enu-
meration of regimen,ts and their description). 
Act of June 3, 1916, c. 134: "The Army of the United States shall con-
sist of the Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps~ 
the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard while in th~ service of the· 
United States, and such other land forces as are now or may hereafter be 
authorized by law." 
Act of June 4, 1920, c. 227, 41 STAT. 759: "The Army of the United' 
States shall consist of the Regular Army, the National Guard while in the 
service of the United States, and the Organ,ized Reserves, including the Offi-
cers' Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps." 
Compare the existing provisions: 10 U. S. C. A. §§ 1 & 2, 3-5 (Supp. 1943)~ 
and 32 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1943). 1: 
"All able-bodied male citizens of the United States, * * * between the-
ages of eighteen and forty-five years, are hereby declared to constitute 
the national forces, and, with such exceptions and under such conditions 
as may be prescribed by law, shall be liable to perform military duty in 
the service of the United States." (10 U. S. C. A. 1.) 
"The Army of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the 
National Guard of the United States, the National Guard while in the 
service of the United States, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Organized: 
Reserves, and the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and shall in,clude persons in-
ducted into the land forces of the United States under sections 301-318 
of Appendix to Title 50." (10 U. S. C. A. 2.) 
"The militia of the United States shall consist of all able-bodied male citi-
zens of the United States * * * who shall be more than eighteen years 
of age and, except as hereinafter provided, not more than forty-five years 
of age, and said militia shall be divided into three classes, the National 
Guard, the Naval Militia and the Unorganized Militia." (32 U. S. C. 
A. 1.) 
107. A good interpretation by a layman of the relation of conscience to the 
State is McCown, Conscience v. The State, (1944) 32 CALIF. L. RJ>v. 1. 
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preme Court and the lower courts, that the right of a conscien-
tious objector to be freed from military service is not a constitu-
tional right, but is by congressional "grace", which can be granted 
or taken away at wil1.108 Julian Cornell, an able attorney for 
conscientious objectors, seems to accept these statements as ex-
pressing the law.109 
In United States v. Schwimmer 110 the Supreme Court ma-
jority denied naturalization to a highly educated woman who 
was an uncompromising pacifist, believing and teaching that per-
sons should not defend the country by arms. Naturalization, they 
held, was a privilege which could be withheld or granted on con-
dition. Although the right to be free from bearing arms was not 
involved-the applicant being a woman-the court seemed to 
state that conscientious objection was not a constitutional right,. 
at least not one protected to an alien seeking citizenship. By 
another 5-4 decision, United States v. Macintosh,111 naturaliza-· 
tion was refused a professor who was not an absolute pacifist but 
felt unable to sign the naturalization oath to defend the Constitu-
tion "against all. enemies, foreign and domestic * * *" since· 
he would "not undertake to support 'my country, right or 
wrong'". The majority of the Court there said: 
"The privilege of the native-born conscientious objector to· 
avoid bearing arms comes not from the .Constitution but 
from the acts of Congress." 112 
Three years later, in Hamilton v. Regents, 113 two conscientious. 
objector students refused to undergo compulsory military train-· 
108. United States v. Newman, 44 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ill., 1942) ; Rase-
v. United States, 129 F. {2d) 204 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942); cases hereafter dis-
cussed. 
109. CoRNEr,r., THE CoNsCIENTIOUS 0BJECroR AND THt LAW (1943), and 
letter to the writer October 27, 1944: "It is well settled that exemptions from 
military service on religious or conscientious grounds is a matter of grace on 
the part of Congress. * * *·" 
110. 279 U. S. 644, 49 Sup. Ct. 448 (1929). Incidentally it is recognized 
that a woman is not subject to military service: "The fact that, by reason of 
se~, age, or other cause, they may be unfit to serve, does not lessen their pur-· 
pose or power to influence others." 279 U. S. at 651; see also supra note 106, 
111. 283 U. S. 605, 51 Sup. Ct. 570 (1931); see also United States v. Bland,. 
283 U. S. 636, 51 Sup. Ct. 569 (1931). 
112. Ibid. at 624. 
113. 293 U. S. 245, 55 Sup. Ct. 197 (1934). 
76 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31 
ing at the University· of California. Expelled, they brought ac-
tion alleging that to compel them to take military training as a 
-condition to their reinstatement was to deprive them of their 
-constitutional right to religious freedom. Not so said the Court, 
for although tlte individual's constitutional right of religious 
freedom 
"* * * does include the right to entertain the beliefs, to 
adhere to the principles and to teach the doctrines on which 
these students base their objections to the order prescribing 
military training.114 
nevertheless, the student was seeking 
"The 'privilege' of attending the university as a student (which) 
comes not from federal sources but is given by the State. It 
is not within the asserted protection * * * California 
has not drafted or called them to attend the university." m• 
The same basis of decision was formulated by Justice Cardozo 
in his concurring opinion: 
"The petitioners have not been required to bear arms for any 
hostile purpose, offensive or defensive, either now or in the 
future. They have not been required in any absolute or 
peremptory way to join in courses of instruction that will 
fit them to bear arms. If they elect to resort to an institu-
tion for higher education maintained with the state's moneys, 
·-then and only then they are commanded to follow courses 
of instruction believed by the state to be vital to its 
welfare." 116 
Justice Butler quoted from United States v. Macintosh and Jacob· 
son v: Massachusetts i11. and Justice Cardozo added: 
"From the beginnings of our history Quakers and other con-
scientious objectors have been exempted as an act. of grace 
from military service." 118 
These cases must be viewed in ·the light of more recent refer-
ence to them in Supreme Court opinions. First, it has been 
114. Ibid. at 262. 
115. Ibid. at 261, 262. 
116 • .fbid. at 265-6. 
117. 197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358 (1905). 
118. 293 U. S. at 266; 55 Sup. Ct. at 206 (1934). 
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reiterated that the basis of these decisions was that the nation and 
state were not making an individual do an act contrary to his 
conscience, to which the court granted his constitutional right to 
adhere; they were merely attaching conditions to a privilege 
sought by the individual. Thus the Supreme Court in the second 
flag salute case said : 
"This issue is not prejudiced by the Court's previous holding 
that where a State, without compelling attendance, extends 
college facilities to .pupils who voluntarily enroll, it may pre-
scribe military training as part of the course without offense 
to the Constitution. It was held that those who take ad-
vantage of it~ opportunities may not on ground of conscience 
refuse compliance with such conditions. Hamilton v. Uni-
·versity of California, 293 US 245, 79 L. Ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 
197. In the present case attendance is not optional." 119 
In Schneiderman v. United States 120 the Court referred to the 
Macintosh decision : 
"The Constitution authorizes Congress 'to establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization' (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 4), and we may 
assume that naturalization is a privilege, to be given or 
withheld on such conditions as Congress sees fit." 
Second, the present Court has apparently accepted the minority 
view in the Macintosh and Schwimmer cases and might not now 
bar an alien from naturalization because of his conscientious 
scruples, much less prevent the exercise of freedom of conscience 
by a natural born citizen. In the Schneiderman case the Court 
denied the power of the government to revoke the naturalization 
of a communist because of his views as such communist. It re-
ferred no less than six times and "agreed to" the dissent of Chief 
Justice Hughes in the Macintosh and Justice Holmes in the 
Schwimmer case and cast doubt on the majority holdings therein: 
"it was held that the statute created a test of belief * * * 
We do not stop to reexamine this construction for even 
if it is accepted the result is not changed. As mentioned be-
fore, we agree with the statement of Chief Justice Hughes 
in dissent in Macintosh's case that the behavior requirement 
119. West Virgio,ia St Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63 Sup. Ct. 
1178 (1943). 
120. ·320 U. S. 118, 131, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 1340 (1943). 
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is 'a general phrase which should be construed, not in op-
position to, but in accord with the theory and practice of our 
government in relation to freedom of conscience.' 283 U. S. 
at page 635, 51 S. Ct. at page 579, 75 L. Ed. 1302. See, 
also, the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in the Sch-
wimmer case, supra, 279 U. S. 653-655, 49 S. Ct. 451, 73 
L. Ed. 889.'' 121 
Nor can one read the recent expressions of the Supreme Court 
discussed elsewhere in this article 122 without sensing the intent 
of the Court to protect individuals in a <;onstitutional right to 
freedom of conscience. 
It is often urged that exemption from service has always been 
granted by statute, that those statutes usually impose conditio~s 
upon the exemption, and that this proves that the right 4erives 
from legislative grant rather than from constitutional provision. 
But this argument proves too much, for legislation may be de-
clarative of or in reasonable regulation of constitutional rights 
as well as unrelated to them. • This is easily illustrated by the 
second flag salute case, W. Virginia v. Barnette/22a wherein the 
court held that a child had a constitutional right based upon the 
child's religious belief to refuse to salute the flag. The Court 
had to find a constitutional right in order to grant protection to 
the child. It did not suggest that the Congressional ;let making 
the flag salute voluntary and granting conscientious objectors 
freedom from military service proved the rights to be matters 
of legislative grace. It implied· that' both were in furtherance of 
the Constitution: 
"The action of Congress in making flag observance voluntary 
and respecting the conscience of the objector in a matter so 
vital as .. raising the Army contrasts sharply with these local 
regulations in matters relatively trivial to the welfare of the 
nation." 123 
A question can properly be raised whether the "free exercise 
(of) religion" guaranteed by the 1st amendment should include 
121. 320 U. S. at 135, 63 Sup. Ct. at 1341 (1943). 
122. See particularly section, Tendency of Supreme Court to Reve.rse Pre-
vious Nationalistic Decisions. 
122a. Supra, note 3. 
123. 319 U. S. at 638, 63 Sup. Ct. at 1185 (1943). 
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the right to refuse to bear arms and the extent to which the fed-
eral government may regulate such right if it exists. 
Certainly the framers of the Constitution knew of the religious 
claims of the dissident sects which refused to bear arms. The 
Convention met in Philadelphia, center of Quakerism. Two 
years earlier the Commonwealth of Virginia had led the way 
by granting full religious liberty.124 "This act was brought about 
by the combined influence of the.dissenters (Presbyterians, Bap-
tists, Quakers, etc.), who formed at that time two thirds of the 
population, and the political school of Jefferson." 125 Washing-
ton had experience in the French wars with Quakers who "chose 
rather to be whipped to death than to bear arms, or lend us any 
assistance whatever upon the fort, or any thing for self-defense," 
until Washington finally had to release them.126 Upon his in-
auguration Washington recognized the Quakers as most "exem-
plary and useful citizens'' "except their declining to share with 
others the burthen of the common defence." 127 There is some 
evidence that a suggestion was made to include a conscience 
clause in the Constitution.128 This was not adopted, apparently, 
as part of the well known decision to omit a bill of rights on the 
ground that it would be dangerous to attempt to define rights lest 
some be omitted and that there was no need to "reserve" rights 
from a government that had only delegated powers.129 Religious 
tests for office were proscribed by the Constitution, and the right 
of affirmation instead of oath was inserted in deference to Quakers 
and similar sects who would not take oaths. So well understood 
124. This, together with Jefferson's earlier Declaration of Rights, June 
12, 1776, remain two of the great documents of American government and 
are the progenitors of all religious liberty provisions in the state an,d feqeral 
constitutions. See 14 HtNING's Cor.r.tc'l'ION ol!' THt LAws OJ!' VmGINIA Ill; 
1 Rev. Code (1819) 32, sec. 16; VA. Cont ANN. (Michie 1942) sec. 34, Vir-
ginia Constitution, sec. 58. 
125. Schaff, Church and State in the United States, Am. Historical Assn., 
28 (1888). 
126. Letters to Gov. Dinwiddie, 2 SPARK's WASHINGTON (1833-1837) 165, 
169-70. 
127. 12 SPARK's WASHINGTON (1833-1837) 168-9; George Washington, The 
Christian, U. S. Geo. Washington Bicent. Comm. p. 13. 
128. 3 FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 29, 290. 
129. One of the best expressions of this is in The Federalist No. LXXXIV:. 
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was this position that no discussion was necessary.130 In the 
:State debates which produced the 1st amendment specific ref-
·erence to Quakers and similar sects was made.131 The states re-
fused to ratify the Constitution unless a bill of rights was added; 
New York, Virginia, North Carolina, Rhode Island, New Hamp-
shire, and the minority in Pennsylvania being especially insistent 
on the protection of religious freedom.132 Soon after the 1st 
amendment was adopted Aedanus Burke spoke strongly against 
the federal or state governments requiring conscientious objectors 
to pay a fee for exemption, because such legislation was "contrary 
to the Constitution." 133 The exemption of "persons conscien-
tiously scrupulous of bearing arms" was referred to as a recog-
nized principle in the first congressional debate on the militia 
bil1 134 and some federal laws exempted religious objectors from 
any armed service.135 
The Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of Quaker's re-
fusal to "doff hats," as an expression of their religious beliefs 136 
and in the famous Davis v. Beason case 137 defined the intention 
of Article I : 
"to allow every one under tl'le jurisdiction of the United States 
to entertain such notions respecting his relations to his 
Maker and the duties they imfo"ose, is may be approved by 
his judgment and conscience, a1Ul to exhibit his sentiments 
in such form .of worship as he may think proper, not inju-
rious to the equal rights of others, * * *" 
There may have been a _time when the First Amendment was 
130. 5 EwOT's D:EBAT£5 (1876) 498, 2 FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 29, 461. 
131. 2 ELLIOT'S D£BA.T£S (1876) 120. 
132. A very good collection of these proposals is in ScHA:n', CHURCH AND 
.STA~ IN TH~ UNI~ STAT£$, pp. 29-34. 
133. Annals of Congress, First Congress II, 1818, 1822, 1824, ·1827. 
134. 4 EwOT's DSBA~ (1876) 424. 
135. E. g. 32 STAT. L. 775, sec. 2, also 1917 and 1940 SelectivP. Service 
Law. 
136. 319 U. S. 624, 633, footnote, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178, 1183 (1942). 
137. 133 U.S. 333, 342, 10 Sup. Ct. 299, 301 (1889). It has been recognized 
that "religious" includes broadly "ethical," U. S. ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 
135 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) and U. S. v. Kauten, 133 F. (2d) 703 
{C. C. A. 2d, 1943). 
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no restriction upon .the states 188 but the substantial protection 
of that amendment is now carried by the 14th. 
The sound position would seem to be that religious freedom 
protects the conscientious objector in his belief, in teaching it, 
and in acting upon it to the point of refusing to bear arms; all 
these rights are, subject to reasonable legislative regulation in. 
protection of the rights of others and of the government; any 
legislative modifict~.tion of the rights must be in response and in 
proportion to a clear and present danger to the rights of others. 
'rhis can be seen from the recent case of Prince v. Massachtt-
setts/39 another Jehovah's Witness case decided after West Vir-
ginia v. Barnette. Mrs. Prince claimed the right for her niece, 
aged nine, to distribute literature on the streets of a city in viola-
tion of a child labor act of Massachusetts providing that no girl 
under 18 should sell or distribute papers, magazines or other 
articles of merchandise on the street. By a 5-4 decision the Court, 
though it recognized that all uthe great liberties insured by the 
First Article * * * have preferred position in our basic 
scheme," held that the Massachusetts provision was a reasonable 
regulation. Similar cases·wm readily come to mind.140 It is, I 
take it, in accordance with this general view that courts have 
held that conscientious objectors during this war must report 
to Civilian Public Service camps.141 The limitation on legisla-
tion regulating the right of conscientious objectors to exercise 
their constitutional right has not yet been fixed; in due course 
by a process of exclusion and inclusion its boundaries can be 
marked out as the boundaries of legislative power have been 
judicially defined in other fields. 
The attention of the reader is again called to the· conclusions 
stated in the outline. This article has not attempted to discuss 
whether peacetime conscription is or is not desirable.142 It has. 
138. Permoli v. First Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U. S. 589,. 
609 (1845). 
139. 88 L. Ed. (Adv.) 403 (1944). 
140. E. g. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878). 
141. E. g. Rase v. United States, 129 F. (2d) 204 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942). 
142. A good collection of material pro and con Will be found in the Hand-· 
book em Conscription, Am. Fr. Serv. Comm., 20 S. 12th Street, Philadelphia, 
Penna. For' those in,terested in abolishing conscription in the world through, 
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said, that either the Constitution will have to be amended or the 
military system will have to be formed in accordance with the 
present Constitution. 
Harrop A. Freenzan. 
WILLIAMSBURG, VA. 
treaty, see the proposals of Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George, Lord Riddel 
and others: THE TREATY OF VERSAILUS AND AFTER (1935) 61-63; BIRDsALL, 
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